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Educated, urbanized - and narrow-minded? A comparative
analysis of political ideology in local parties
Abstract
This paper aims to explore the strength and causal determinants of ideological thinking within political
parties. The degree of “ideologization” includes two dimensions: “horizontal couplings”, as they are
manifested in intercorrelations between different beliefs or opinions; and “vertical couplings” as they
appear in the degree to which specific beliefs are related to more abstract concepts like “left” and “right”
The results presented show shockingly high trends of ideologization at least on the left-center section of
the spectrum, especially in the vertical dimension. Urbanization stands out as a major causal factor: On
both sides of the spectrum, ideological constraints are significantly higher in larger than in smaller
communities, and more pronounced in suburban settings than in villages far from the next city. Only in
rather small communities, it is found that ideologization correlates positively with the educational level
and the modern occupational background of party members, with the exposition of the local sections to
the programs of supralocal mother parties, and with the number of other local parties with which they
have to compete. In communities of given site, ideological thinking is more pronounced when parties
possess a small share of political power (or none at all). Finally, there is evidence that ideological
constraints in party policy has increased since the late eighties of the last century, and that it may
increase further because younger age cohorts are more prone to clustering issue positions tightly and for
relating them closely to abstract notions of “left” and “right”. In contradiction to most conventional
wisdom, we may tentatively conclude that political thinking is more “rational” (or at least more flexible
and pragmatic) at the peripheries than in the more central spheres of modern societies.
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1. „Ideology”: an ambiguous concept
In everyday talk as well as in political discourses and scientific theory building, the term "ide-
ology" has many different, even contradictory, connotations.
On the one hand, "ideological thinking" denotes a tendency
- to cling to rigid mental stereotypes instead of recognizing the reality and adapting prag-
matically to situational conditions;
- to interpret and evaluate all issues according to the same monistic guidelines, instead of
judging each on its own intrinsic merits;
- to identify with ready-made collectivistic opinions instead of relying on one’s capacity of
autonomous thought.
Therefore, there is always a tendency to attribute ideological thinking to adversaries, while
exempting oneself from this stigma.
"Ideology, it has been said, is like halitosis—something other people have. Many of us believe
that our adversaries are afflicted with ideological bias, but we find it difficult to see our own
moral and political convictions as springing from anything other than good reason and sound
evidence." (Jost et. al. 2008).
In Marxism, there is an equally negative tone that stresses the causation of ideologies by un-
derlying economic conditions and their function to support reigning power systems by propa-
gating systematically distorted views of society and social relations.
On the other hand, there is also a long tradition in social science to see ideology in a much
more positive way: as a correlate of higher intellectual sophistication. In this view, ideological
thinking is characterized by high stability, internal logical coherence and consistency, based
on the capacity to relate specific issues to more abstract principles and to organize different
attitudes to logically consistent wholes (Allport 1962; Converse 1964; Gerring 1997).
This view gave rise to the notion that people with high political interest and expertise are most
likely to structure attitudes toward political issues in ideologically consistent ways (Converse
1964; Zaller 1992; Federico/ Schneider 2007), while most ordinary citizens (especially the less
educated) lack ideological thinking because their political views are found to be incoherent,
volatile and logically flawed. (Bishop 2005; Converse 1964; McGuire 1985/1999).
"....the fact remains that many citizens are unable to understand and structure their prefer-
ences in terms of the abstract ideological concepts that organize elite political discussion and
activity, perhaps compromising their capacity to effectively engage the political system."
(Federico/Schneider 2007:222).
Following Federico and Schneider (2007), two dimensions of ideological attitude-structuring
may be distinguished:
"Horizontal constraints" or "political belief consistency" (Converse 1964).
This concept relates to the degree to which issue opinions among are interrelated among
each other: so that to know one attitude helps much to infer all the others. Scaling methods as
well as factor-analytic and cluster-analytic approaches are useful to detect such patterns of
mutual interrelation.
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In this perspective, left and right (or liberalism vs. conservatism) are not ideological poles en-
dowed with an ex ante determined content, but just clusters of issue opinions that appear in-
ductively when intercorrelation matrices are analyzed and dimensionally reduced.
This accords with Gabel and Huber who assert that methodologies aiming to place reliably
political parties on the left-right dimension in a consistent manner impose no a priori meanings
on the concepts of left and right. Consequently the most successful methods are those that
locate parties with the "vanilla" method, which reduces ideology to a consistency constraint on
parties' issue positions (Gabel and Huber, 2000: 96).
"Vertical constraints": (or "Level of conceptualization" (Converse 1964):
This concept denotes the tendency to relate specific issue opinions hierarchically to higher
order constructs of ideology, e. g. one's placement on the left-right continuum (Federico/
Schneider 2007: 232 passim). Such vertical patterns are manifested by measuring differences
between issue-attitudes and ideological scale values, or by calculating the correlations be-
tween these two.
By applying these concepts, experimental research studies have found for instance that sur-
vey respondents who are asked to think carefully about a variety of issues show greater con-
straint among attitudes toward these different issues (Judd and Downing 1990; Lavine et al.
1997).
However, this "rationalistic" perspective has been heavily attacked by psychologists who again
stress the importance of non-rational factors in the genesis of ideological thought.
For instance, Federico and Schneider criticise such views as unduly "cognitivistic" and stress
the importance of motivational factors in processes of ideological structuring: e. g. the (situa-
tionally conditioned) subjective needs, wants and goals that promote tendencies to aggregate
and constrain perceptions, opinions and judgments (Federico/Schneider 2007).
In a similar vein, Jost et al. have argued that ideological thinking may well derive its internal
coherence not from logics, but "acquires coherence and structure from psychological needs,
motives, and constraints that vary both situationally and dispositionally." (Jost et. al. 2008).
Especially "conservatism" has been widely interpreted as a highly synthetic world view that
encompasses
- a wide range of political opinions all derived from two basic premises: the acceptance of
inequality (Bobbio 1996; Knight 1999) and the resistance to change (Wilson 1973; Jost
et. al 2003).
- an even wider range of world-views, values and attitudes related to basic personality
characteristics like "authoritarianism" (Adorno et. al. 1950) , "need for cognitive closure"
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), anxiety arising from mortality salience (Greenberg et al.,
1990), "intolerance of ambiguity" (Kirton, 1978), "uncertainty avoidance" (Jost el. al.
2008) or simple "fear of change" (Rossiter 1968).
"There have been many sceptics of the notion that most people are ideologically inclined, but
recent psychological evidence suggests that left–right differences emerge in many life do-
mains. Implicit and explicit preferences for tradition, conformity, order, stability, traditional val-
ues, and hierarchy — versus progress, rebelliousness, chaos, flexibility, feminism, and equal-
ity — are associated with conservatism and liberalism, respectively. Conservatives also score
consistently higher than liberals on measures of system justification. Furthermore, there are
personality and lifestyle differences between liberals and conservatives as well as situational
variables that induce either liberal or conservative shifts in political opinions. Our thesis is that
ideological belief systems may be structured according to a left–right dimension for largely
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psychological (rather than logical) reasons, including variability in the needs to reduce uncer-
tainty and threat." (Jost et. al. 2008).
Such views lend themselves easily to the negative evaluation of ideological thinking as a
weakness rather than strength: a disposition to let political attitudes and decisions be gov-
erned by emotional factors, character traits or habitualizations - factors related to the evaluat-
ing subject rather than to the evaluated cause.
While psychologists are professionally disposed to focus on intrapersonal motivations and
dispositions, sociologists - even when they are not Marxists - are more inclined to include fac-
tors related to social interaction, collective group formation, society and culture. Adopting this
perspective, it is fascinating to learn that, there are pronounced differences between various
segments of societal elites.
First of all, it has been found that highly consistent belief systems are highly pronounced
among cultural elites, while they less prevalent among elites highly involved in (political or
economic) decisions.
"We also find that élites dealing professionally with ideas and values (e.g., religious leaders,
leading journalists, and movie makers) have more consistent belief systems than governmen-
tal élite groups, while business leaders and military leaders exhibit the least degree of con-
straint." (Lerner et. al. 1991).
This regularity may indicate that high involvement in powerful roles may be incompatible with
the maintenance of ideological consistency because there is too much need to do justice to
each particular problem and to adapt to issue-specific and situational conditions. On the other
hand, ideologies may well flourish within powerless groups who can easily cultivate consis-
tency because they are not forced to test out whether such views could be upheld "in prac-
tice".
Secondly, it has been found that ideological thinking is more ubiquitous among human sci-
ence academics than among those with a background in natural or applied sciences (Lerner
et. al. 1990). This may indicate that ideological patterns are heavily conditioned by factors not
related to politics at all: in this case: variables related to professional socialization.
2. Left-right ideology: conceptual and theoretical issues
While originating from mutually very distant disciplines (like sociology, psychology, sociology
and political science), most studies on ideology converge in the point that ideological thinking
in politics is mainly organized along a single dimension spanning between "conservative vs.
"liberal" or "left" vs. "right".
A wealth of empirical evidence shows that the left-right axis is almost ubiquitously salient in
two ways in a wide range of different countries: as a polarity that structures bipolar political
conflicts and as a continuum that allows differentiated comparisons on an ordinal or interval
scale (Castles & Mair 1984; Gross & Sigelman 1984; Janda 1980; Laver & Budge 1993; War-
wick 1992). Thus, most citizens in most developed democratic countries (including the United
States) are willing and able to place themselves on the left-right dimension: a scale usually
ranging from 1-10 or from 0-10. (Inglehart/Klingemann 1976; Colomer/ Escatel 2004: 3). Simi-
larly, voters as well as political elites use the LR scale for characterizing social movements,
political parties, candidates, news media, issue positions, political programs and governing
regimes.
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It is well known that the political left-right dimension has originated in France at the time before
the revolution, some weeks after the convention of the Estates General in June 1789 (La-
ponce 1981:47). As an intuitive variable derived from the seat order in parliament, it filled the
vacuum created by the demise of estate membership as a dominant criterion of classification.
Like the top-bottom model of social stratification, the LR scheme is a simple spatial metaphor
that has the characteristic of being translatable in all languages and being potentially adopted
by all human cultures (Laponce 1981: 27).
"Left’ and ‘right’ are not just ideologies ... they indicate opposing programs in relation to many
problems whose solution is part of everyday political activity. These contrasts concern not only
ideas, but also interests and judgments on which direction society should be moving in; they
exist in all societies, and it is not apparent how they could disappear." (Bobbio 1996: 3)
The ubiquity of such one-dimensional schemes is best explained by the "functionalist" theory
which assumes that the salience of the LR continuum is particularly high under conditions of
high political complexity and low political information (Fuchs/Klingemann 1990).
As a starting premise, the theory assumes that most people spend little efforts for acquiring
and synthesizing political information, because they have little skills to do that or no available
time. However, under conditions of political democracy, all citizens are called to make deci-
sions despite the fact that most of them are unable or unwilling to collect much detailed infor-
mation on the political sphere. Given these conditions, they have a great need for simplifying
stereotypes helping them to decide which parties, leaders or political programs they should
support.
“In a political context, the left-right dimension represents a typical form of social cognition:
When people reflect on politics, they tag themselves and others (people, groups, institutions,
etc.) as ‘left’ or ‘right’. Acting on this understanding, they usually vote for parties and candi-
dates they perceive as being close to their own left-right placement and also usually take pol-
icy views in line with their left-right position.” (Kroh 2005.)
Especially when political conditions are highly complex and non-transparent, citizens tend to
rely on rather simple heuristic shortcuts in order to gain orientation and to come to non-
ambiguous voting decisions with a minimum of personal efforts (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and
McPhee 1954; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986; Neuman 1986; Popkin 1994; Hinich and
Munger 1994). Such labels facilitate also political communication, because they create a
common background of meaning that can be presupposed ex ante, so that it has not to be
created on every single occasion.
The salience of the left-right dimension can be minimal in two party systems, because party
preferences can easily be built up without referring to ideological notions. In more complex
and competitive multiparty systems, however, many voters will feel a need to locate them-
selves on the left-right scale in order to identify the parties and candidates most akin to his
own views (Fuchs/Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1998), and parties will use ideology as an in-
dispensable tool for "branding their products" in political campaigns (Downs 1957; Co-
lomer/Escatel 2004).
In conformity with Converse's observation that highly educated and politically interested indi-
viduals were more inclined to think in ideological terms (Converse 1964), various more recent
studies have shown that politically sophisticated individuals are better able to make use of
political labels like “left” and “right” because they are better informed about their meaning
(Sniderman et.al. 1991; Kitschelt/Hellemans 1990; Klingemann 1979 etc.), and that issue po-
sitions and left-right self placements are more tightly correlated when the level of political cog-
nition is high (e. g. Inglehart/Klingemann 1976).
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This level of political cognition has been shown to be critically dependent on political interests
and activities on the one hand and the educational level on the other (Inglehart/Klingemann
1976).
“In short, the greater the sophistication of an individual, the better her capacity for capturing
meanings most commonly assigned to left-right labels by that society, that is for sharing the
dominant conception of left-right-terms. Second, assuming that it requires greater cognitive
capacity to understand and link policy stances, as opposed to symbolic components, to left-
right semantics, we should expect that, the more sophisticated the individual, the more she
should define ideological terms along policy lines and vice versa for the less sophisticated.”
(Zechmeister 2005:11).
However, this of course presupposes that there exists a relatively consensual, culturally an-
chored conception of “left” and “right” in the given national society: so that it is just a question
of cognitive capacity whether it is perceived adequately or not.
Nie and Andersen have found high consistency and intercorrelations among elites’ responses
on a wide range of issues concerning the scope of government activity enabling them to iden-
tify clear “liberals” and “conservatives.” On the level of uneducated strata, however, “there is
little or no interdependence … in mass attitudes, because mass publics have neither the edu-
cational background, the contextual knowledge nor the capacity to deal with abstract concepts
that sustain an organized set of beliefs over a wide range of political issues” (Nie/Anderson
1974).
Given the high causal relevance of political interest and political communication, it is to be
expected that political elites are most likely to maintain tight relationships between left-right
self placements and issue positions. In fact, Eurobarometer studies have shown that within a
sample of political candidates, the statistical variance explained was four times as high than
within a sample of ordinary voters (Inglehart 1989: 368).1
The astonishing permanency of the spatial left-right metaphor contrasts sharply with extreme
variations of the meanings associated with these two terms during history and across different
cultures.
Whoever identifies leftism with socialism should well remember that in the beginning 19th cen-
tury, it was mainly associated with individualism, free enterprise, national independence and -
following Rousseau - an endeavour to restore a more perfect form of human society as it had
presumably existed in the past (Laponce 1981: 118ff.).
Between about 1850 and 1960, leftism was almost exclusively amalgamated to socialist and
communist ideologies associated with the various labour movements - thus giving priority to
questions of economic organization, class relations and social welfare. Given the long dura-
tion of this phase, several scholars have tried to identify the “invariant core” of substantive
values and political issues that define difference between left and right.
While S M. Lipset (1954) defined leftism as the fight for more equality, Downs has tied it down
to governmental economic interventions (Downs 1957).
A comprehensive attempt to identity the transnational semantics of left-right ideologies was
made by Laver and Budge on the level of Paneuropean Manifesto data. Applying factor analy-
sis, they have extracted 26 items defining leftist and rightist party positions.
On the left side, the list includes issues like governmental control of capitalism, nationalization
of enterprises, internationalism and the expansion of social services, while rightist parties were
1 Similarly, Lambert et. al. have found in a large Canadian sample that respondents with low education
were least able to connect left-right self placements with specific political attitudes and issue positions
(Lambert et., al. 1986).
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consistently characterized by an emphasis on traditional morality, law and order, free enter-
prise and national autonomy (Laver/Budge 1993).
In the late sixties, the civil rights movements and the student revolts gave rise to a new, more
encompassing understanding of leftism (or: "radicalism"): including the perspective of extend-
ing basic standards of human rights and welfare to all kinds of discriminated population seg-
ments (like non-whites, females, gays, starving poor in underdeveloped nations etc.). In a
broader sense, there emerged potent movements of "social liberalism" directed against all
traditional values and habits that sought to prevent full individual self-determination (e.g. the
feminist and "pro-choice"-movement). Within the same time period, ecologist issues gained
increased prominence on political agendas and were incorporated in programs aiming to cata-
lyze societal and economic change. Finally, processes of globalization and regional suprana-
tional integration (within Europe) have given rise to new controversies where basic strategies
of foreign policy are at stake.
However, there is no agreement whether all these "postmaterialist" issues become increas-
ingly assimilated to "leftism", or whether they are the nucleus of a second (orthogonal) ideo-
logical dimension.
On the one hand, there is considerable evidence that no amalgamation is taking place.
Thus, Inglehart presented convincing empirical data which showed that the attitudes of the
general electorates of seven European countries toward "materialist" issues and toward
"postmaterialist" issues are rather weakly correlated with each other. As correlations are par-
ticularly low among younger age cohorts, it is concluded that intergenerational change is con-
tributing to a growing independence of these two dimensions (Inglehart 1984, 25ff; Inglehart
1989: 372ff.).
Following a similar argument, Clark and Lipset suppose that rising affluence and intergenera-
tional change contribute to a growing salience of "social value issues" which constitute "a dis-
tinct political dimension from more traditional economic or fiscal issues." (Clark/Lipset/Rempel
1993: 305).
According to Clark, a "new political culture"(NPC) is emerging, particularly among the young
and better educated strata, in which "leftism" becomes
- less associated with fiscal issue positions and with the demand for a "strong government"
- more connected to "social issues" (woman's question, minority rights etc.) (Clark 1991).
In contrast to socialist collectivism, this new leftism is more associated with individualism: im-
plying an affirmative position toward markets and private actions, and a growing skepticism
toward governmental bureaucracy. All these ideological changes are facilitated in wealthier
environments (Clark/Inglehart1998). In a similar vein, Kitschelt has argued that in addition to
the traditional LR dimension, a second axis extending between an "authoritarian" and a "liber-
tarian" pole is gaining weight (Kitschelt 1994).
Besides social liberalism, ecologism is also said to constitute a new ideological dimension less
and less associated with conventional radicalism. Thus, a cross-national study (comparing the
populations of England, Germany and the United States) has found that ecologist attitudes are
not correlated with standings on traditional left-right issues (like governmental control) (Kes-
sel/Tischler 1984).
Finally, Simon Hix and Fritz Scharpf claim that processes of European integration have given
rise to a new dimension that divides those who favor this process from those who want to pre-
serve national autonomy (Hix 1999; Scharpf 1996). They both assert that the public attitudes
toward issues of European integration tend to be correlated with Left-Right positions, but con-
stitute a distinct dimension of political conflict in Western Europe.
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On the other hand, there is also evidence that attitudes toward "old" and "new" political issues
are significantly interrelated, and that this linkage has not been eroded by either socio-
economic development or intergenerational change.
1) Ecologism and social liberalism start from the basic premise that processes of socio-
economic development have resulted in a neglect of other important values and/or in enor-
mous negative consequences that call for compensative and/or corrective actions (on the level
of governmental legislation action as well as on the level of everyday life).
2) Both ideologies gave rise to "new social movements" very similar in terms of membership
composition, rhetoric, tactical behavior and internal organization. Among other similarities, all
these movements relied much on informal network structures, recruited their membership
mainly from younger and more educated strata (particularly from social and cultural occupa-
tions) (Kriesi 1989)
3) It cannot be denied that during the last 20 years, many Western countries (particularly in
Europe) have seen the emergence of "red-green parties" which combine ecological and social
liberalist standings with pronounced leftist positions in all traditional domains (e.g. in economic
and social policy ) (Poguntke 1987).
In a sophisticated empirical study, Weakliem (1991) has shown that the "materialist" and the
"postmaterialist" dimension of political ideology show considerable values of interfactor corre-
lations (between .40 and .60). This is quite consistent with Inglehart's findings that, at least for
political elites, materialistic and postmaterialistic issue positions appear to remain more closely
linked and to be components of an overarching left-right dimension encompassing economic
as well as non-economic issues. (Inglehart 1984: 33).
According to Inglehart, the functional needs for organizing politics along a single "left-right"-
dimension are so imperative that - in the long run at least - postmaterialistic issues will be-
come assimilated to this dimension rather than evolving to an independent second ideological
axis (Inglehart 1984: 37).
All this conforms to Sani and Sartoris view that Left and Right are just "empty containers" that
can be filled with various meanings by anybody (Sani/Sartori 1983).
In her extensive study based on Eurobarometer data from 1999, Corrie Potter concludes that
"..The semantic container hypothesis is strongly supported. Postmaterialism values are
significant predictors of left self-placement, while material values are strong predictors of right
self-placement. Thus, the post-materialism/materialism cleavage seems to have been incorpo-
rated onto the left right dimension in the understandings of Western Europeans. (Potter 2001:
7).
Evidently, the LR-dimension has an astounding capacity to absorb new political values, issues
and strategic goals (e. g. of social movements) (Mair 1997: 26; Inglehart 1984; Knutsen 1995).
However, these new aspects seem to complement and overlay the old ones without replacing
them.
Some researchers dealing with the semantics associated with the LR scale have also indi-
cated that basic asymmetries exist between the two poles. Thus, it has been found that post-
materialist values are strong predictors of left placement, while opinions on materialist are
more determinative for rightist positions (Potter 2001).
In several other empirical studies, it was found that rather tight correlations between issue
positions and left-right self ratings exist for the left half of the continuum, while on the right
side, the explanatory power of political attitudes is much reduced. As Laponce concludes from
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a metaanalysis of such studies, this is true for most issues conventionally related to the LR-
continuum: e.g. attitudes toward economic regulation, nationalism or gender equality (La-
ponce 1981: 158ff.). As the author himself has verified in a study on local parties in Switzer-
land, the same is also true for items related to financial policy, immigration policy or environ-
mental protection (Geser 1992).2
In fact, there is wide agreement that the general decline of class voting has not at all contrib-
uted to a decline of such ideological factors. To the contrary, it has caused political thinking to
be more determined by subjective attitudes, among which ideological concepts of leftism and
rightism are still of paramount importance (Knutsen 1988; Kim/Fording 1998; Freire 2006: 367
). As a consequence, the correlations between LR-self-placements and political attitudes may
be become even more conditioned by individual education and individual political exposure:
because individuals have to learn the exact meanings of left and right in their respective soci-
ety, and they have to synthesize different values and issue positions in order to get an overall
value on the one-dimensional LR scale.
While it is universally acknowledged that ideological contents vary according to the flow and
ebb of different political issues, it is sometimes still upheld that such variabilities are just pe-
ripheral changes that don’t affect an invariant conservative core:
"Granting that ideologies—like other attitudes—possess a high degree of malleability, we ar-
gue that it is still worthwhile to consider the psychological characteristics of conservative
thought. Specifically, we propose that one might distinguish between a relatively stable ideo-
logical core of conservatism comprised of resistance to change and acceptance of inequality
and more ideologically peripheral issues (such as school busing or gun control) that are likely
to vary considerably in their ideological relevance across time. Because the conservative core
may be grounded in powerful and relatively stable individual needs, it may persist as a deep
personality structure, the surface manifestations of which might change with the tides of social
and political debate." (Jost et. al. 2003: 342).
In the era of conventional class politics, ideological cores were sufficiently defined by stable
interests deriving from the position of collectivities within the socio-economic system. In post-
materialist ages where particular interests are substituted by generalized "values", this speci-
ficity and stability has evidently been lost. Instead, ideologies become more dependent
- on subjective personal factors and character traits (e. g. "conservative" mentalities char-
acterized by high security needs and low tolerance of ambiguity);
- on divergences conditioned by cultural traditions (as they are currently manifested in the
very different attitudes of European countries toward nuclear power);
- on fads and fashions which may dominate the political agenda for transitory periods of
time.
Consequently, we may well see a higher variability of "leftisms" and "rightisms" in the future,
while the degree of ideological cohesiveness may well remain the same, because the same
needs for simplification are persisting on the individual as well as on the political level.
2 This accords well with an earlier American study by Johnson who found that liberal clergymen were
highly inclined to hold highly consistent liberal attitudes, while conservative pastors were much less
consistent in their (rightist) views, His interpretation was that conservatives were politically less involved
than liberals, so that they were less knowledgeable about the ideological patterns institutionalized in
their surrounding political culture (Johnson 1967; Kiecolt/Hart 1988).
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However, it cannot be denied that all these different issues were too heterogeneous (and too
variable) to be part of a logically consistent ideological belief system.3
Thus, the notion of "postmaterialism" (Inglehart) reflects just the fact that the new issues are
not primarily related to vital interests of specific societal groups, while the concept of "new
liberalism" focuses on a highly generalized attitude of "cosmopolitanism" and "anti-
institutionalism" particularly prominent among highly educated younger cohorts (Bell 1979,
Brint 1984).
Likewise, it is not evident why these new issues can easily amalgamate wit the old "material-
ist" contents of left and right, as it is almost impossible to find the commonalities that make
them parts of a coherent ideological whole.
For instance: if it's true that conservatives have an increased need for security: why are they
more prone to carry the risks connected with nuclear power plants? And why are leftist parties
fighting so vigorously for the abandonment of atomic energy, when this results in such cost
increases for electricity that they risk to lose their traditional electorate (lower social strata).
Similarly, it is not evident that attitudes toward EU membership and European integration have
become a left-right issue in many countries. Why are the leftist (e. g. in Switzerland) in favor of
such a project which is associated with so many developments they don't appreciate: the lib-
eralization of trade and labour markets, the intensified fight against immigration from Southern
countries; the demise of national worker protection?4
If highly educated strata are more prone to maintain tight constraints among opinions to all
these issues: why does this indicate that their thinking is in any way more sophisticated than
the less interrelated attitudes of less educated citizens? Doesn't this manifest just the contrary:
that educated people are more disposed to take over ready-made collective stereotypes that
to rely on autonomous individual reflection, more eager to create in-group conformity than to
generate guidelines for pragmatic judgments and decisions?
3. Local parties as a field for studying "ideological cultures"
The following empirical study intends to shed a light on the actual ideological culture in Swiss
politics and on its relationship to the status-characteristics of politically active populations.
In contrast to the "political culture" which encompasses more basic "rules of the game", ideo-
logical cultures may be seen as more variable pattern co-varying with long-term changes of
societal value systems as well as more short-term developments on the level of social move-
ments, salient issues or attitudinal "fashions".
Nevertheless, the concept of "ideological culture" implies the existence of collective political
perspectives, values and goals governing the behavior of individuals and organizations that
are transmitted by regular processes of socialization.
In general, average individual citizens are rather poor informants of "culture" because their
thinking is heavily shaped by psychological idiosyncrasies and because they often lack the
cognitive and intellectual capacities needed to perceive and interpret these collective patterns
adequately.
3 Thus, the "new social movements" themselves never produced a coherent encompassing ideology
comparable to Marxism and Socialism in the case of the labour movement. (see: Brand/Büsser/Rucht
1984: passim).
4 A special case here is Sweden where leftists are more EU-critical because they fear lowering welfare
standards.)
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Studying politically active elites may be a better approach, but it still assumes that cultural
patterns are adequately mirrored in the subjective consciousness of individual minds.
By studying groups and organizations, more justice can be done to the basic fact that culture
is primarily expressed in the outcomes of collective communications and activities: e.g. in the
explicit results of discussions, negotiations and deliberative procedures, in formally stated de-
cisions and action programs or at least in mutually recognized "majority opinions".
Political parties have particularly strong links to ideological culture because it is their job to
contribute to the aggregation and articulation of collectively shared opinions, values and goals.
It is evident that in general, party groupings will tend to maintain more consistent and integra-
tive ideological standings than individuals, because
a) it is their job to aggregate the attitudes of their divergent members and factions into ex-
plicit action programs and specific political decisions
b) their visible public status sets them under high pressure to be consistent in order to
appeal to potential voters or adherents.
"In modern politics and mass media-dominated political communication, it is usually assumed
that, by using a simplified, encompassing ideological dimension, party leaders and candidates
can transmit useful information on policy programs which can be understood by voters without
paying high costs. It has, thus, been postulated that a party position on the left-right dimension
can synthesize a number of party policy positions on many issues – an intuition that has re-
peatedly been submitted to scrutiny and empirically tested." (Colomer/Escatel 2004)
This implies that high intercorrelations between different issue opinions (like "socialism" and
"ecologism") among parties may not at all reflect a similar covariance on the level of their indi-
vidual members: but rather their particular success in aggregating "socialist factions" and
"ecological factions" into an overarching party platform (e.g. for simple tactical reasons of win-
ning elections).
In an even wider and longer perspective, political parties can be seen as active agents that
define for everybody else in society what is the (current) meaning of "left" and "right".
"I would suggest that the process of mapping new cleavages onto the left-right dimension in-
volves attitude adjustment by both elites and electorates. Political parties send out messages
about what issue positions belong to the left and right, and adjust their manifestos to maximize
votes (Sani and Sartori, 1983). Voters pick up cues from the media and elites about the con-
sistency of positions on new issues with previously held attitudes." (Potter 2001: 6).
Local party sections have the additional virtues of being so numerous that rigorous multivari-
ate methods of comparative analysis can be applied, and of being so low in organizational
complexity that a single central member is capable of delivering all the relevant information.
Switzerland is outstanding for the fact that formalized part groupings are astonishingly wide-
spread even among very tiny municipalities (of 500 or less inhabitants), and that they control
to a high degree all major political processes on the communal level (Geser et. al 1994: pas-
sim).
Given the mix between direct and representative democracy typical for Swiss politics, most of
these local parties have the dual function of influencing elections on the one hand and deci-
sions about specific political issues on the other. With a total number of about 200000 partici-
pative adherents (= ca. five percent of Swiss voters), these groupings encompass the major
part of all politically active citizen in the country.
Hans Geser:: Educated, Urbanized – and Narrow-minded? http://socio.ch/par/ges_18.pdf
13
4. Reseach questions and Hypotheses
In the following, we want to explore some factors that determine to what extent the issue posi-
tions, goals and action courses of political parties are structured by ideological constraints.
Two aspects of "ideologization" have to be distinguished:
1) "Horizontal constraints" consist in the mutual interrelationships between different issue posi-
tions. In operational terms, they reach their maximum when knowing the opinion on issue A
allows me to predict with certainty the opinions on issues B, C, D... to Z, and they are minimal
when no predictions are possible because intercorrelations are zero. Evidently, horizontal
constraints can effectively be assessed by factor-analytic methods that explore to what degree
intercorrelation matrices between issue opinions can be reduced to very few common dimen-
sions.
2) "Vertical constraints" are defined by the degree to which attitudes to specific issues are
related to higher-order ideological concepts like "liberalism" vs. "conservatism" or "left vs.
right". In operational terms: they can be assessed by the certainty and precision with which
the placement on such ideological scales can be predicted when opinions on all particular
issues (A,B,C.... to Z) are known. Evidently, such assessments call for multivariate regression
methods that allow to measure the cumulative explanatory power of all the issues in ques-
tions.
Minimal ideologization would be defined as a totally unconstrained political standing where the
opinion about each issue is generated independently and without guidance by superordinate
"Weltanschauungen" or programmatic structures: on the basis of its own intrinsic merits and
by adapting to particular needs and problems, current trends in the media or demoscopic sur-
veys, and specific situational conditions. Evidently, such openness would have to be payed
with heavy loads of permanent information gathering, communication and consensus-building
procedures, and it will make it difficult for a party to formulate programs and to establish and
maintain a consistent and clear-cut public identity.
Theoretically, these two aspects could vary independently of each other. Thus, dense horizon-
tal clusterings could be found without any relation to more abstract ideological notions, or is-
sue positions may be tightly coupled to ideological concepts despite the fact that they are mu-
tually unrelated. (This second case is easily identified by multivariate regression equations
where different issue positions maintain high explanatory power despite the fact that their mu-
tual interrelationships have been eliminated (by means of statistical controls).
However, notions like "leftism" or "rightism" always imply a combination (and positive covaria-
tion) of horizontal clusterings and vertical couplings: especially among more educated and
politically sophisticated respondents who have enough knowledge about the current meaning
of ideological labels and skilled enough in processes of mental abstraction.
On a general level, it has to be expected that in contrast to supralocal (especially national)
party organizations, local parties may well maintain a much lower level of ideology, because in
the realm of community politics, issues are often defined as non-political problems to be
solved by mere common sense or technical expertise (Vidich/Bensman 1968, Geser 2003).
Nevertheless, we expect that local parties are basically also subject to the same patterns of
one-dimensional left-right polarity as it is reigning in the encompassing political system.
1) We expect that a certain degree of horizontal as well as vertical ideologization is present
among all political parties, and that these clusterings and constraints can be unambiguously
identified in conventional terms of "left" vs. right".
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2) It is to be expected that this main ideological dimension encompasses a broad range of
"materialist" as well as "postmaterialist" issue positions. Other ideological dimensions (e. g.
related to social liberalism, ecologism, international openness etc.) may also be found, but
they are likely to be of secondary importance.
3) We acknowledge the possibility that there are asymmetries between "leftism" and "rightism"
in the degree of ideologization. On the one hand, we are open for the notion that "conserva-
tives are the real dogmatists" because they have a heightened need for cognitive structures
and a decreased capacity to tolerate ambiguity and change. We recognize that since Adornos
seminal work on the “authoritarian personality" (Adorno et. al. 1950) until today, a horde of
liberal psychologists have taken great efforts to denounce conservatives as "closed minds" -
while asserting at least implicitly that liberals (= they themselves) are exempt from such re-
strictions by being more open, rational - and better human beings in most relevant cognitive
and moral aspects (e. g. Tomkins 1963; Wilson 1973; Altemeyer 1998; Jost et. al. 2003;
2008). On the other hand, we take into account the thorough empirical evidence that falsifies
such claims: e. g. the impressionistic historical regularity that leftist (e. g. socialist and com-
munist) movements and parties have been forerunners in political ideologization since the
middle of the 19th century, while ideologies on the rightist side (including national socialism)
were mainly reactive and have remained on lower levels of coherence and consistency. In
more rigorous quantitative terms, this regularity has been corroborated by several studies that
have found vertical couplings between issue positions and ideological self-placement to be
much stronger on the left-to-center than on the center-to-right section of the Left-Right scale
(see. Laponce 1981:158ff; Geser 1992; Potter 2001).
4) It is expected that ideologization is conditioned by various characteristics of the social and
cultural setting within which parties operate. Given the notoriously low salience of ideological
thinking in (especially rural) communal politics (Vidich/Bensman 1968; Holler 1981), we will
expect ideology to become more prominent with increasing city size (or proximity to bigger
cities) and increasing degree of "communal politicization".
On a more general level, we follow Converse, Inglehart/Klingemann and many others in as-
suming that the meaning of left and right is an ingredient of political culture in which not all
citizens are equally involved. Therefore, take into consideration the possibility that political
ideology is predominantly articulated in the very centers of society and by the more educated
strata (Converse 1964; Laponce 1981: 158ff.;Gerring 1997; Bishop 2005). Consequently, es-
pecially vertical couplings should be highest in parties that operate in an urban (or suburban)
municipality with a highly educated population.
5) For the same reasons, ideological constraints are likely to co-vary with party membership
composition. In particular, we expect higher ideology when larger percentages of party activ-
ists stem from modern sectors of the economy and have higher educational degrees.
6) In addition to socio-economic conditions, cultural factors are also likely to affect the tenden-
cies toward ideological constraints. Considering the results of an earlier comparative study
conducted by this author, it might be expected that at least vertical constraints are more pro-
nounced in the German-speaking parts of Switzerland than in the French and Italian region
(Geser 1992). Such divergences may well be caused by the higher political autonomy of
communities and the more pronounced traditions of direct democracy in the German speaking
cantons.
7) We remember Lerners's finding that ideological thinking is most pronounced within marginal
(e.. g. cultural) elites not involved in far-reaching (political or economic) decisions (see above).
This could result from the fact that high policy involvement creates pressures to adapt prag-
matically to particular problems and situational conditions, while powerlessness offers better
opportunities to preserve "ideological purity" because no full "reality tests" have to be faced.
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By following this argumentation, it can be assumed that conditions for maintaining coherent
ideological beliefs may be better when a party doesn't actively participate in executive political
power, or when its share of formal power is rather small. Very high political involvement (e. g.
when a party reigns with absolute majority) will be incompatible with high ideological consis-
tency for several reasons: e. g. because such parties have to be responsive to the total popu-
lation (not only to narrow electoral clienteles) and because taking concrete decisions usually
imply that parties adapt to pragmatic conditions hic et nunc, irrespective of precedences, other
political issue positions and more abstract ideological stances.
8) We expect that in municipalities of given size, ideological constraints will rise with the num-
ber of competing political parties for two reasons. First, every single party has more leeway to
appeal to special electorate groups and give priority to internal purity and coherence, because
it has not to take the overall perspective of the total community. Secondly - following the func-
tional theory of Fuchs and Klingemann (1990) - parties in complex political systems have to
streamline and simplify their positions and programs, so that citizens are better able to make
electoral decisions without having to gather and synthesize much information.
9) Ideological constraints should increase to the degree that local parties are penetrated by
supralocal mother parties: e. g. by taking over and following their political programs. Especially
in smaller communities where endogenous ideology pressures are low, such exogenous influ-
ences are likely to be pronounced.
10) Impressed by the widely articulated mantra of "ideological revivals" (Hinich/Munger 1994;
McCarthy/Poole/Rosenthal 2006; Baldassari/Bearman 2007 etc.), we ask how degrees of
horizontal and vertical ideological constraints change over time. Fortunately, our data sets
allow detailed assessments of changes and stabilities between 1989 and 2002, because sur-
vey waves with partially identical questions were conducted at these two points of time. Addi-
tional insights in current trends of intergenerational ideological change are gained by compar-
ing local party sections with older and younger members.
5. Data and variables
The following empirical study is based on two mailed-out surveys (conducted in 1989 and
2002) that have included all (about 5000) local party sections in all (about 2800) Swiss com-
munities of all three linguistic regions. The questionnaires were sent by mail to the current
heads of these sections. They were asked to provide information about the political goals and
values of their grouping as well as on its membership composition, internal organizational
structure, political activities and relationship to the supralocal party levels.
As the return was about 50% in both waves, a rather large sample of more than 2600 units
was achieved: providing the basis for testing rigorously a manifold of hypotheses with multiva-
riate statistical procedures (Table 1).
Table 1: Sample size of local party sections 1989 and 2002: according to linguistic region.
Language region: 1989 2002
German 2039 1994
French 336 399
Italian 263 262
Total 2638 2655
Hans Geser:: Educated, Urbanized – and Narrow-minded? http://socio.ch/par/ges_18.pdf
16
Given the pronounced legal autonomy of Swiss municipalities (especially in the German
speaking cantons), it is not astonishing that local parties also have much leeway in their rela-
tion to the supralocal mother parties to which they formally belong. As a consequence, they
are rather free to define their political standings by adapting to characteristics of their mem-
bership base and various conditions of their local setting.
Among many other questions, respondents were asked to place their party section on a left-
right scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).
As seen from Table 2, more than 95% of all participants were ready and able to provide such
a judgment, and the whole range of values was actually used.
Comparing the two waves, there can be concluded that
- the notions of "left vs. right" seems to have increased somewhat in salience, because the
share on non-respondents has considerably declined (from 4.3 to 2.9 percent);
- only minor changes have occurred in the overall distribution. In particular, extremely leftist
and moderately rightist groupings have slightly increased, while sections on the extreme
right have lost ground.
Table 2: Distribution of local parties on the left-right scale according to the judgment of the par-
ty president) 1989 and 2002: percentage values.
Value on the Left-Right Scale No
Answer1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1989 1.3 5.1 11.6 10.0 13.3 18.6 16.7 14.0 3.4 1.7 4.3
2002 1.8 6.1 13.2 9.2 13.2 17.2 18.7 14.1 2.7 .9 2.9
(N = )
33
47
133
154
301
335
260
233
346
335
485
438
434
475
363
360
88
69
45
24
113
75
Secondly, informants had to indicate the opinions reigning within their groupings on a manifold
of crucial political issues known to be associated with positions of "left" and "right".
"In favor" and "against" mean that a stable and considerable majority is active members are
(dis)agreeing on the issue, so that the party section as a whole can follow consistently these
political lines. "Mixed" means that either no secure and stable majority is existing for either
position, so that there is no reliable basis for consistent political action.
Given the shifts of the political agenda, some new issues had to be included in 2002, so that
only ten out of 15 issue positions can be compared over time.
Looking at Table 3, it is remarkable that the frequency distributions on most items are highly
skewed. Social desirability factors may well have effected that informants were inclined to
"agree" to any items proposed: so that results may have been somewhat different when alter-
native (negative) formulations would have been used.
As in Table 2, a closer inspection shows that no clear overall shifts to the left or the right have
occurred in the critical period, While support for some leftist demands (budget expansion,
closing of nuclear power plants) has increased, welfare commitments to immigrants have de-
clined and critics of the Swiss financial sector (under heavy international attack because of its
banking secrecy practices) have lost ground.
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Table 3: Distribution of party opinions on 15 salient political isses 1989 and 2002 (percentage
values).
Leftist political issues:
1989 2002
Opinion of local party Opinion of local party
pos. mixed neg. pos. mixed neg.
Empowerment of workers/employees 44 41 16 41 41 18
Higher tax rates for the wealthy -- -- -- 42 26 31
Expanding public budget for social welfare 40 31 29 52 33 15
Expanding public budget for cultural matters 43 38 19 49 38 12
More ecological restrictions on public projects 73 24 3 58 34 8
Nuclear energy should be abandoned 24 41 35 30 36 34
More efforts for achieving gender equality 77 20 3 77 19 4
More public daycare facilities for kids -- -- -- 52 29 19
Better care for asylum seekers / refugees 20 50 30 18 31 51
Switzerland should become member of the EU -- -- -- 33 34 33
The Swiss Army should be abolished -- -- -- 14 20 66
Rightist political issues:
Promoting Switzerland as a financial center 41 38 20 59 28 13
Reducing the tax load 63 27 10 63 23 14
Less governmental reglementation 64 26 10 63 24 14
More efforts for increasing public security -- -- -- 72 20 8
Considering the semi-nominal character of these opinion scales, nonparametric methods of
analysis have to be applied.
For assessing the horizontal constraints (=interrelations between variables), Multiple Corres-
pondence Analysis (MCA) seems an adequate procedure because it parallels factor analysis
in reducing intercorrelation matrices to a minimum number of dimensions: with factor scores
that indicate the relationship of each variable vis-à-vis these extracted factors, and inertia val-
ues that measure the percentage of total variance explained by each factor.
The vertical constraints are assessed by correlating issue opinions with the values of the left-
right scale by using Spearman's rank correlation coefficients rho, and by calculating a multiple
linear regression equation with the LR scale as the dependent variable. Using regression me-
thods seems unproblematic because the (approximately normally distributed) Left-Right scale
may well be treated as an interval variable, and because the method is known to be quite ro-
bust when nonparametric predictors are included (Labowitz 1970; Anderson 1984).
Additional data used in this study are taken from Federal census data of 1990 and 2000, and
from several Swiss community surveys conducted in 1988, 1994 and 2005. In these mailed-
out surveys, the central civil service officials ("Gemeindeschreiber”) were asked to provide
information about the formal political and administrative structure as well as about informal
political processes in their community and its relation to the supralocal political levels.
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6. Empirical results
6.1 Basic ideological constraints in the total sample
By tackling our first, most basic hypothesis, we explore to what extent Swiss local party sec-
tions operate under conditions of horizontal and vertical constraints, whether such constraints
are coinciding with notions of "left" and "right", and whether they are equally or unequally pro-
nounced on the left and the right half of the LR scale.
As the most conspicuous result, Table 4 shows that very pronounced constraints exist on the
left side of the ideological spectrum. The dense interrelationships between the 15 issue opi-
nions (horizontal constraints) is manifested by a very strong first factor that absorbs 46.7% of
the total variance and shows positive factor loadings by all variables included. Such cluster-
ings go along with strong vertical constraints as they are visible in the high correlation of each
issue variable with the self placement value on the LR scale and in the high cumulative statis-
tical explanation achieved by the multivariate regression in which all issue variables are in-
cluded as (mutually independent) predictors (64.5%).
Table 4: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints in the left-center and the center-right
section of the LR scale (total sample of Swiss local parties) (wave 2002).1)
Issues:
left scale
section
(1-6)
right scale
section
(5-10)
left
scale
section
(1-6)
right
scale
section
(5-10)
MCA factor
scores
MCA factor
scores
Corr.
with LR
scale
value
Corr.
with LR
scale
value
I II I II
Promoting Switzerland as a financial center (inv) .561 .066 .149 .087 .65 .17
Empowerment of workers/employees .462 .088 .273 .107 .50 .23
Higher tax rates for the wealthy .440 .117 .246 .134 .53 .25
Reducing the tax load ( inv) .422 .051 .127 .097 .51 .22
Expanding public budget for social welfare .606 .386 .534 .324 .56 .34
Expanding public budget for cultural matters .455 .269 .370 .290 .47 .24
Less governmental reglementation (inv) .481 .111 .174 .045 .57 .13
More ecological restrictions on public projects .284 .083 .201 .064 .36 .22
Nuclear energy should be abandoned .572 .141 .323 .142 .61 .20
More efforts for achieving gender equality .196 .045 .125 .100 .29 .15
More public daycare facilities for kids .453 .216 .275 .208 .46 .19
More efforts for increasing public security (inv) .397 .066 .062 .058 .48 .08
Better care for asylum seekers / refugees .653 .405 .489 .257 .61 .27
Switzerland should become member of the EU .412 .136 .241 .166 .48 .21
The Swiss Army should be abolished .613 .120 .248 .064 .64 .15
Eigenvalues 7.006 2.300 3.838 2.144
Explained inertias .467 .153 .256 .143
Corrected R-square (multivariate regression) .645 .180
(N = ) (1030) (1190) (1030) (1190)
1) All data have been arranged in way that more leftist positions score higher in positive values and positive
correlations indicate positive relationships with leftist positions. Thus, the values of the four items that tap
rightist issues have been inverted.
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On the other hand, no equivalent patterns of rightist ideology can be found. While the MCA
procedure produces also a predominant first factor, its explanatory power (25.6%) as well as
its scope are on a much lower level. Similarly, vertical couplings to the left-right dimension are
so loose that by including all predictors in a linear regression, just 18% of the total variance in
LR placement can be explained.
Evidently, our data are quite efficient to tap the ideological polarization between leftism and
centrist political positions, while they are inadequate to account for differences that set centrist
parties apart from the extreme right. As these results conforms with several other studies
(mentioned above), they invite the question whether are caused just by a biased selection of
political issues, or whether they reflect the fact that "rightism" is more defined by elements of
political "style" and behavior rather than by substantive stances toward political issues and
goals.
However, all speculations that the traditional LR dimensions may be challenged by other (e. g.
postmaterialist) dimensions are refuted. While a second sector has been extracted in both
scale sections, its profile is very weak and it is neither related to ecologism nor to social libe-
ralism or to nationalist-internationalist aspects as they have been postulated by different scho-
lars (see above section 2).
6.2 The impact of community size and (sub-)urbanization
If it is true that urbanized settings promote higher degrees of ideologization, we should find
that horizontal as well as vertical couplings are more dense when a community is either itself
urbanized (by having a large number of inhabitants), or when it is located in an urbanized ag-
glomeration rather than in rural areas. This second aspect has been measured by asking res-
pondents how much time is needed to travel from their community to the next larger city (with
more than 100 000 inhabitants) by means of public transportation.
Looking first at the impact of community size in the left-center part of the LR scale (Table 5a),
it is evident that horizontal as well as vertical couplings are less pronounced in smaller than in
middle-sized municipalities, and reach maximal values in cities with more than15000 inhabi-
tants. In addition, some shifts in the content of leftist ideology can be observed insofar as "ur-
ban leftism" is more tightly associated with the demand for expanding the budget for culture
and with negative attitudes toward tax cuts and the expansion of public security measures
(while the classical socialist issue of "worker empowerment" loses ground).
However, a rather generalized tendency of leftist ideologization seems to go along with in-
creasing city size: encompassing 12 out of 15 items in the case of horizontal coupling and 13
out of 15 issues in the realm of vertical constraints.
Inspecting the center-right part of the LR scale (Table 5b), it is evident that rightist ideologies
are rather weak in smaller as well as middle-sized communities, while winning considerable
ground above the level of 15000. In these larger settings, being "rightist" means particularly:
favoring nuclear energy and tax cuts, and opposing public budget expansion, help for asylum
seekers as well as subsidized kid daycare facilities and Swiss membership in the EU.
As a summary, we may conclude that larger city size promotes ideological structuring on both
sides of the LR scale, but somewhat more so in the vertical than in the horizontal dimension.
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Table 5: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints: according to size of community (wave
2002).
a) Left- center section of the LR scale
Political Issues:
MCA factor scores Correlation with Left-Right scale placement
Community size Community size
<
2000
5000-
10000
>
15000
<
2000
5000-
10000
>
15000
Promoting Switzerland as a financial center (inv) .496 .554 .650 .58 .66 .76
Empowerment of workers/employees .378 .521 .448 .44 .58 .41
Higher tax rates for the wealthy .362 .514 .501 .45 .59 .54
Reducing the tax load ( inv) .260 .434 .599 .38 .53 .64
Expanding public budget for social welfare .520 .632 .623 .49 .61 .55
Expanding public budget for cultural matters .387 .480 .618 .36 .49 .64
Less governmental reglementation (inv) .394 .510 .512 .51 .57 .67
More ecological restrictions on public projects .289 .258 .250 .31 .37 .36
Nuclear energy should be abandoned .495 .590 .560 .53 .65 .61
More efforts for achieving gender equality .209 .192 .214 .25 .31 .37
More public daycare facilities for kids .417 .460 .473 .40 .49 .48
More efforts for increasing public security (inv) .292 .393 .585 .41 .48 .62
Better care for asylum seekers / refugees .578 .658 .658 .50 .64 .68
Switzerland should become member of the EU .431 .421 .365 .44 .50 .43
The Swiss Army should be abolished .562 .609 .738 .61 .62 .76
Eigenvalues 6.070 7.228 7.795
Explained inertias .405 .482 .520
Corrected R-square (multivariate regression) .576 .669 .769
(N= ) (316) (507) (110) (316) (507) (110)
b) Center-right section of the LR scale
Political Issues:
MCA factor scores Correlation with Left-Right scale placement
Community size Community size
Lower
than
2000
5000-
10000
More
than
15000
Lower
than
2000
5000-
10000
More
than
15000
Promoting Switzerland as a financial center (inv) .113 .114 .337 .03 .18 .26
Empowerment of workers/employees .204 .287 .301 .16 .28 .27
Higher tax rates for the wealthy .215 .208 .340 .21 .26 .27
Reducing the tax load ( inv) .038 .140 .489 .16 .23 .37
Expanding public budget for social welfare .526 .514 .619 .30 .31 .53
Expanding public budget for cultural matters .391 .363 .420 .21 .22 .41
Less governmental reglementation (inv) .194 .145 .072 .13 .14 .07*
More ecological restrictions on public projects .174 .204 .331 .16 .22 .36
Nuclear energy should be abandoned .280 .295 .428 .14 .20 .38
More efforts for achieving gender equality .156 .116 .098 .12 .15 .24
More public daycare facilities for kids .348 .282 .277 .17 .18 .36
More efforts for increasing public security (inv) .025 .054 .307 .07* .06* .20
Better care for asylum seekers / refugees .451 .486 .547 .23 .24 .40
Switzerland should become member of the EU .244 .228 .348 .18 .22 .36
The Swiss Army should be abolished .234 .223 .287 .13 .16 .12
Eigenvalues 3.595 3.659 5.200
Explained inertias .240 .244 .347
Corrected R-square (multivariate regression) .105 .182 .297
(N = ) (422) (587) (104) (422) (567) (104)
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As a next step, we want to explore whether irrespective of community size, ideologization is
also affected by the degree to which a community is located in an "urbanized" or "suburba-
nized" setting. The travelling time needed to reach the next larger city (with more than 100 000
inhabitants) seems to be a fruitful indicator, because it taps not so much the physical distance,
but the "social distance" (e. g. relevant for daily work commuting as well as leisure time inter
action). In order to exclude artIfact effects arising from the positive correlation between city
size and "metropolitan proximity", only middle-sized communities (with populations ranging
between 2000 and 5000) are included in the analysis.
As seen from Table 6, vertical ideological constraints are consistently decreasing with increas-
ing metropolitan distance in the left as well as the right half of the ideological spectrum, while
horizontal issue clusterings are only affected in the center-right section of the scale.
Evidently, effects stemming from urbanization are not restricted to endogenous factors result-
ing from higher intracommunal politicization, but also from exogenous factors associated with
the encompassing urbanized, sub-, peri- or nonurbanized setting in which the community is
located.
Table 6: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints in the center-right section of the LR
scale: according travelling distance to the next larger city (over 100 000 inhabitants) (only com-
munities between 2000 and 10000 inhabitants)
Travelling time to the
next big city (mi-
nutes)
Multiple Correspondence
Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression
of issue opinions on
LR placement
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
-15 .545 .461 .299 .74 .74 .30 35 / 37
16-30 .550 .483 .295 .77 .65 .35 85 / 107
31-45 .507 .476 .271 .74 .72 .27 76 / 81
46-60 .482 .478 .225 .71 .69 .16 68 / 80
61-90 .498 .512 .249 .60 .68 .05 42 / 53
91+ .457 .458 .219 .59 .58 .10 62 / 68
6.3 Divergences between cultural regions
Switzerland is a genuine "multicultural" country composed of three regions that don't just differ
in language (German, French and Italian), but in a large number of cultural characteristics that
also extend to ideological levels. In a previous study (also using data from the nationwide par-
ty survey), the author has found that vertical constraints (between specific issue opinions and
generalized self placements on the Left-Right dimension) were considerably stronger in Ger-
man-speaking parts of country than in the two remaining ("Romanic") regions (Geser 1992).
Within the theoretical framework presented here, this could well be explained by the fact that
German speaking cantons provide their communities with larger autonomy, so that more
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Table 7: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints in the three linguistic regions of Switzer-
land (only communities between 2000 and 10000 inhabitants).
a) left-center scale section
Political Issues:
MCA factor scores Correlation with Left-Right scale placement
Region Region
German French Italian German French Italian
Promoting Switzerland as a financial center (inv) .563 .489 .678 .66 .71 .72
Empowerment of workers/employees .570 .507 .225 .58 .69 .22*
Higher tax rates for the wealthy .564 .361 .177 .62 .43 .43
Reducing the tax load ( inv) .452 .319 .561 .53 .46 .59
Expanding public budget for social welfare .681 .572 .290 .61 .52 .50
Expanding public budget for cultural matters .518 .341 .214 .52 .37 .34
Less governmental reglementation (inv) .529 .447 .592 .56 .68 .58
More ecological restrictions on public projects .265 .278 .419 .38 .36 .44
Nuclear energy should be abandoned .610 .632 .290 .65 .66 .43
More efforts for achieving gender equality .212 .218 .066 .31 .26 .02*
More public daycare facilities for kids .448 .624 .365 .48 .47 .48
More efforts for increasing public security (inv) .374 .450 .505 .48 .44 .58
Better care for asylum seekers / refugees .673 .650 .564 .65 .65 .53
Switzerland should become member of the EU .429 .394 .415 .52 .43 .40
The Swiss Army should be abolished .634 .404 .660 .65 .57 .68
Eigenvalues 7.521 6.686 6.019
Explained inertias .501 446 .401
Corrected R-square (multivariate regression) .678 .623 .573
(N= ) 589 57 36 563 57 36
b) center-right scale section
Political Issues:
MCA factor scores Correlation with Left-Right scale placement
Region Region
German French Italian German French Italian
Promoting Switzerland as a financial center (inv) .174 .162 .172 .19 .27 -.28*
Empowerment of workers/employees .347 .195 .240 .29 .34 -.06*
Higher tax rates for the wealthy .247 .147 .048 .27 .31 -.03*
Reducing the tax load ( inv) .199 .018 .002 .25 .19* -.07*
Expanding public budget for social welfare .503 .302 .518 .37 .15* .01*
Expanding public budget for cultural matters .301 .346 .482 .26 .06* -.05*
Less governmental reglementation (inv) .167 .128 .098 .17 .01* .07*
More ecological restrictions on public projects .226 .187 .220 .26 .06* .03*
Nuclear energy should be abandoned .309 .168 .208 .25 .03* .11*
More efforts for achieving gender equality .102 .159 .225 .19 -.09* .16*
More public daycare facilities for kids .206 .574 .183 .24 .03* -.10*
More efforts for increasing public security (inv) .042 .179 .139 .05* .14* .02*
Better care for asylum seekers / refugees .516 .485 .336 .31 .05* -.14
Switzerland should become member of the EU .202 .185 .188 .27 .02* .25*
The Swiss Army should be abolished .253 .107 .220 .15 .30 -.07
Eigenvalues 3.795 3.341 3.694
Explained inertias .253 .223 .246
Corrected R-square (multivariate regression) .229 .262 .048
(N= ) 476 83 23 476 83 23
* Insignificant correlation (p > .10)
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genuine "community politics" (instead of mere administrative activities) take place. However,
part of the divergences may also be explained by the smaller community size in certain (espe-
cially Italian speaking) regions.
By focusing on middle-sized communities, it is evident that leftist ideology is most pronounced
in the German region and least articulated in the Italian speaking canton (Ticino), with the
"Romandie" (= French speaking Western Switzerland) falling in-between (Table 7a).
At the same time, there are considerable divergences on the level of content. In Germanic
regions, leftism is predominantly related to issues of fiscal policy and public expenses, while in
the Western French cantons, questions related to worker empowerment and nuclear energy
(and in Southern parts governmental regulation issues and public security concerns) are of
primary importance.
Looking at the right scale section (Table 7b), it is evident that while horizontal clustering is not
affected by regional culture, vertical constraints are highest in the Romandie and fully inexis-
tent within the Italian speaking population, with German Switzerland occupying an interme-
diary position.
Again, attitudes toward fiscal and welfare policies are most tightly related to rightism in Ger-
man cantons, while in the French regions, traditional class related issues (worker empower-
ment and tax-based redistribution policies) are still occupying a crucial place.
6.4 Membership composition
The well-documented empirical regularity that educated people tend to more strict ideological
thinking is only partially reproduced. In small communities (with less than 2000 inhabitants),
horizontal as well as vertical constraints increase dramatically with rising percentages of highly
educated active members, when the total sample is considered. While this regularity may at
least partially be caused by the higher educational level in leftist groupings, it does not com-
pletely disappear when the ideological direction of the party is controlled. Thus, leftist sections
show much higher vertical ideologization when many members possess higher educational
degrees. All this contrasts with the conditions in middle-sized communities where overall im-
pacts of education are weaker and more concentrated to the center-right section of the scale
(Table 8b).
Apart from formal education, we may speculate that insofar high as political ideologization is a
correlate of modern urban society, we will find that it is less pronounced in parties where a
large percentage of members stem from “traditional” occupations. For testing this hypothesis,
we calculate the percentage of active members who are farmers or self-employed (excluding
free professionals who are of course more numerous in modernized settings).
Similar to Table 8, Table 9 shows that such occupational impacts are most pronounced in the
smallest communities. Here, trends toward tight ideology are highest in leftist as well as righ-
tist party sections in which the share of traditional occupational strata is insignificant or nil (Ta-
ble 9a). In middle-sized settings, however, such impacts can only be found in groupings on
the center-right section of the LR scale – similar to Table 8a which shows the same asymme-
try in the case of education.
These findings conform well with the argument that leftist ideologies have always been con-
ceived as a ready-made, highly explicit constructions easy to grasp by low-educated people
(e. g. unionized workers), while rightist, conservative ideologies were less formal, so that their
grasping and precise definition depends more on factors of individual motivation and skills.
Table 8: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints in party sections with different percen-
tages of highly educated active members
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a) Communities below 2000 inhabitants
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Percentage of active
members with higher
education
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
-15% .384 .396 .247 .56 .57 .20 234 / 311
16-30% .459 .468 .277 .69 .67 .09 80 / 101
30-40% .462 .440 .244 .70 .77 .15 21 / 27
41+% .547 -- .382 .87 .94 .-- 17 / 14
b) Communities between 2000 and 10000 inhabitants
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Percentage of active
members with higher
education
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
-15% .508 .469 .267 .67 .63 .20 192 / 215
16-30% .544 .496 .242 .77 .70 .24 112 / 111
30-40% .536 .480 .240 .86 .78 .44 31 / 33
41+% .551 .515 .349 .76 .67 .35 45 / 38
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Table 9: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints in party sections with different percen-
tages of active members who stem from traditional occupational strata (farmers and self-
employed).
a) Communities with less than 2000 inhabitants
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Percentage of active
members who are
farmers or self-
employed*
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
36+ .242 .280 .221 .17 .04 .15 30 / 85
21-35 .310 .331 .237 .44 .65 .08 30 / 62
1-20 .388 .374 .231 .68 .58 .30 71 / 65
0 .467 .414 .339 .64 .49 .33 53 / 31
b) Communities with 2000-10000 inhabitants
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Percentage of Active
members who are
farmers or self-
employed*
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
36+ .387 .438 .213 .68 .62 .12 37 / 88
21-35 .336 .374 .231 .73 .72 .19 45 / 90
1-20 .493 .445 .214 .39 .68 .20 124 / 122
0 .432 .357 .307 .47 .49 .38 123 / 41
* free professionals excluded
6.5 Complexity of the communal party system
Functionalist theories predict that the salience of the left-right dimension increases with the
complexity of the political system, because it provides an easy categorical scheme for com-
paring and evaluating large numbers of political positions, politicians, regimes or political par-
ties. By synthesizing their issue positions to highly structured bundles labeled as “leftist”, cen-
trist” or “rightist”, even less interested voters can easily make up their mind about their prefe-
rences without engaging in cumbersome information gathering and multidimensional evalua-
tions.
While the high correlations of ideological constraints with city size may well be partially ex-
plained by the fact that larger communities tend to have more local parties, the number of par-
ties may well be a determinative factor independent of size.
As seen from Table 10a and 10b, this hypothesis is only borne out for leftist ideology in small-
er communities between 2000 and 5000 inhabitants, while no effects are visible in larger
communities and in the right section of the scale.
We may speculate that in more sizable communities, ideological tendencies are sufficiently
supported by other factors (e. g. the high politicization of community affairs (see 6.6) or the
higher impact of supralocal party politics (see 6.8), so that intracommunal factors like the
number of local party sections is no longer decisive.
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Table 10: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints of local parties according to the total
number of competing local parties in the community
a) Communities with 2000-5000 inhabitants
Number of local party
sections in communi-
ty
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
-2 .349 .378 .249 .57 .59 .15 30 / 46
3 .475 .425 .228 .63 .61 .29 192 / 215
4 .483 .446 .251 .63 .66 .05 112 / 111
5+ .539 .467 .265 .80 .72 .40 45 / 38
b) communities with 5000-10000 inhabitants
Number of local party
sections in communi-
ty
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
-3 .514 .489 .341 .70 .41 .45 25 / 24
4 .552 .581 .295 .65 .51 .28 26 / 29
5 .565 .545 .290 .75 .68 .30 41 / 45
6-9 .529 .477 .291 .80 .69 .22 43 / 38
6.6. Political and apolitical views of community affairs
Especially in smaller settings, community affairs are widely considered as nonpolitical issues
to be settled by common sense, technical rationality or by applying supralocal legal rules and
administrative procedures: so that there is no place for power play and controversies on the
level of values and goals (Geser 2003). In the United States, even larger cities have been af-
fected by the "progressive reform movement" which reinforced nonpartisan managerial con-
ceptions of city government dedicated general "community welfare", not to the interest of par-
ticular groupings and electoral clienteles (Kemp 1999). Under such conditions, we expect that
the need for ideological structuring is much less than in settings where "real politics" like on
cantonal or the national level takes place.
For tapping this variable, party heads were asked whether according to their own judgment,
community issues were (overall) "nonpolitical questions". Not unexpectedly, respondents who
disagreed were more likely to stem from leftist and urban than from rightist and nonurban par-
ties, so that it is indispensable to control these two variables in order to find out whether
"community politicization" is an independent causal factor.
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Table 11: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints: according to (non)political interpreta-
tion of community issues and LR scale section (only communities between 2000 and 10000 in-
habitants)
a) Communities with less than 2000 inhabitants
Community affairs
are not political
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
Agree strongly .288 .280 .253 .12 .39 .12 71 / 99
Rather agree .365 .385 .235 .07 .53 .07 261 / 309
Rather disagree .503 .472 .253 .11 .63 .11 111 / 112
Disagree strongly .511 .418 .412 .29 .41 .23 57 / 58
b) Communities with 2000-5000 inhabitants
Community affairs
are not political
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
Agree strongly .351 .363 .247 .40 .60 .12 53 / 71
Rather agree .448 .436 .240 .66 .59 .19 164 / 210
Rather disagree .600 .517 .250 .78 .71 .22 64 / 66
Disagree strongly .603 .500 .393 .70 .60 .08 31 / 30
c) Communities with 5000-10000 inhabitants
Community affairs
are not political
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
Agree strongly .344 .366 .309 .38 .21 .08 27 / 16
Rather agree .507 .479 .287 .66 .70 .18 981 / 96
Rather disagree .629 .626 .326 .79 .88 .17 45 / 46
Disagree strongly .636 .598 .347 .77 .95 .28 27 / 25
Inspecting Table 11, it is evident that in municipalities of various size, the degree of horizontal
ideological structuring tends to be higher when community affairs are defined in political (ra-
ther than technical, legal or administrative) terms. These trends are similarly strong in the left
and the right section of the LR scale. In the vertical dimension, however, the results are much
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less consistent, except in the largest size category (5-10000 inhabitants) where the salience of
“left” and “right” reaches maximum levels when a highly politicized interpretation of community
matters prevails.
In addition, Table 11 makes clear that the higher levels of ideology found in leftist parties and
sections in larger communities are partially caused by the higher politicization levels of these
same groupings, because divergences shrink considerably (especially on the right side), when
this variable is controlled.
6.7 Power position of the party within the community
In well established democracies like Switzerland, cynical sayings like "Power corrupts and
absolute power corrupts absolutely" (Baron Acton 1887) may only have limited relevance, but
they may not be completely mistaken. As in all political systems, parties that without any share
in political power have least difficulty in maintaining "ideological purity", because they are not
involved in "compromising" decisions and because their responsibility extends just to their
members and voter clienteles, not to the community as a whole.
By contrast, parties reigning with absolute majority have to shift ideological points of views into
the background, because they have to adapt to all sorts of pragmatic considerations (e. g.
caused by financial scarcities or organizational deficits) and because they or obliged to focus
on the general welfare of the whole population.
Therefore, we expect a negative correlation between a party's share of formal power (opera-
tionalized as the percentage of seats it holds in the communal executive board) and its degree
of ideologization.
Table 12: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints: according percentage of seats in the
communal executive and LR scale section (only communities between 2000 and 10000 inhabi-
tants)5
Percent seats in ex-
ecutive
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to self
placement on LR scale
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
0% .563 .453 .330 .75 .58 .29 77/ 51
1-15% .551 .467 .309 .75 .58 .21 77 / 53
16-30% .525 .496 .261 .72 .71 .15 115/ 117
31-50% .447 .457 .250 .59 .65 .20 94 / 161
51%+ .374 .417 .228 .46 .68 .09 45 / 75
As seen in Table 12, this prediction is borne out very strongly in the total sample, but much
less in the subsamples representing the left and the right section of the scale. Evidently, the
total sample effect is mainly caused by the regularity that powerless parties are more likely to
be leftist parties - which maintain higher degrees of ideology irrespective of any other condi-
5 As parties are more likely to have a smaller power share in larger communities (because more local
parties are competing), it is viable to control population size in order to eliminate potentially confounding
effects.
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tions. Among rightist parties however, the expected trend seems to hold: sections have lowest
levels of horizontal clustering and vertical couplings when they control over 50% (= the abso-
lute majority) of the executive seats.
6.8 Programs of supralocal parties
Swiss local party sections enjoy a rather high autonomy vis-à-vis their supralocal mother par-
ties which is based on formal statutes as well as on the fact that they have to rely basically on
their own financial means and organizational capacities. Therefore, it is up to them to what
degree they give much weight to the values, goals and programs of the cantonal and national
party.
Starting again with the premise that political ideologies are mainly generated and maintained
on the level of supralocal politics, we expect higher ideological structuring among parties that
open themselves up to such influences, instead of cultivating their own local perspectives. As
in the case of politicization, it has to be considered that supralocal orientation is generally
stronger in the case of leftist and urban parties, so that ideological orientation as well as com-
munity size have to be controlled.
In Table 13 below, it is shown how horizontal and vertical constraints co-vary with the relev-
ance attributed to the program of the national party to which the section belongs. Again, it is
seen that in the case of leftist parties, horizontal issue clusterings and vertical couplings are
considerably increased when the national program is given much importance, while rightist
parties are less affected. This may be easily explained by the fact that rightist national parties
maintain rather lose programmatic conceptions, so that local sections do not find much orien-
tation.
Table 13: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints: according to the importance given to
nation al party programs and LR scale section (wave 2002).
Importance of national
party program
“Horizontal” constraints: de-
gree of interrelatedness of 10
issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to
self placement on LR scale
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
Total
sample
left
scale
section
right
scale
section
N:
left / right
unimportant .373 .377 .230 .56 .54 .17 152/213
moderate important .485 .475 .263 .69 .66 .16 421/550
important .591 .511 .287 .78 .69 .27 238/212
Table 14: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints: according to the importance given to
nation al party programs and community size (wave 2002)
Importance of national
party program
“Horizontal” constraints:
degree of interrelatedness of
10 issue positions
“Vertical constraints”: rela-
tionship of 10 indicators to
self placement on LR scale
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
-2000
inhab.
2000-
10000
inhab.
10000+
Inhab.
-2000
inhab.
2000-
10000
inhab.
10000+
Inhab.
N:
left / right
unimportant .284 .429 .509 .44 .58 .60 112/111/32
moderately important .386 .491 .603 .50 .67 .77 223/386/136
important .556 .601 .633 .75 .78 .84 96/187/85
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From Table 14, we may conclude that the salience of national programs is at the same time
- a genuine causal factor with a strong impact irrespective of city size;
- an intervening variable that conditions the degree to which city size is impinging.
Its strong impact in smaller cities indicates that ideologies of local parties are primarily deter-
mined by exogenous factors when endogenous municipal influences are low. By analogy, its
reduced effect in supralocally orientated groupings corroborates the hypotheses that such
endogenous influences are rather irrelevant when exogenous ideologization prevails. Howev-
er, very highest levels of ideologization ensue when intracommunal and supralocal pressures
are present at the same time.
6.9 Recent and current changes in ideologization
Given that opinions on ten (out of 15) issues have been assessed in both waves of the Swiss
party surveys, changes in the degree and kind of party ideology occurring in the period 1989-
2002 can be assessed at least in the realm of "stable" issues that have been salient at both
points of time.
As seen from Table 15, horizontal as well as vertical ideological structuring has significantly
increased on the left side of the spectrum, while on the right side, changes are weak (in the
case of MCA factor clusterings) and inexistent (in the covariations between issue positions
and LR placements).
Table 15: Changes in horizontal and vertical ideological constraints in the left and right section
of the LR scale: comparing waves 1989 and 2002 (total sample)
Political Issues:
“Horizontal” constraints:
degree of interrelatedness
of 10 issue positions
“Vertical constraints”:
relationship of 10 indica-
tors to self placement on
LR scale
MCA factor scores Correlation withLR scale value
left scale
section
right scale
section
left scale
section
right scale
section
1989 2002 1989 2002 1989 2002 1989 2002
Promoting Switzerland as a financial center(inv) .534 .567 .191 .149 .61 .65 .23 .17
Empowerment of workers/employees .468 .469 .383 .307 .52 .50 .23 .23
Reducing the tax load ( inv) .280 .453 .042 .151 .36 .51 .15 .22
Expanding public budget for social welfare .489 .643 .519 .570 .46 .59 .25 .34
Expanding public budget for cultural matters .337 .474 .295 .404 .35 .47 .13 .24
Less governmental reglementation (inv) .416 .500 .249 .188 .45 .57 .13 .13
More ecological restrictions on public projects .173 .327 .149 .234 .22 .36 .16 .22
Nuclear energy should be abandoned .535 .576 .265 .341 .58 .61 .21 .20
More efforts for achieving gender equality .148 .216 .146 .130 .23 .29 .18 .15
Better care for asylum seekers / refugees .505 .661 .377 .494 .47 .61 .22 .27
Eigenvalues 3.89 4.89 2.62 2.97
Explained inertias .389 .489 .262 .297
Corrected R-square (linear multivariate regres-
sion) .550 .620 .172 .171
(N = ) 1177 1131 1326 1283 1177 1131 1326 1283
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Most interestingly, leftism has become more and more defined in terms of "materialist" as-
pects (especially related to governmental tax and budget policy), while the relevance of
"postmaterialist" issues (like nuclear of gender policy) has not much shifted. This trend contra-
dicts evidently any "new politics" conceptions which predict that leftism has been (or is going
to be) increasingly redefined in terms of postsocialist dimensions like "ecologism", "social libe-
ralism" and the like. A conspicuous exception is the classical socialist item of "worker empo-
werment" that has lost ground – maybe because traditional working class structures have
eroded.
Table 16 shows that the rise in leftist ideology has taken place in communities of all size cate-
gories, while on the right side, increases in ideologization haves only occurred in urban set-
tings. In addition, the impression is corroborated that changes since the late 80ies have main-
ly resulted in increasing the tightness of clusterings among issue opinions, while vertical
couplings to the left-right dimension have not been much affected.
Table 16: Changes in horizontal and vertical ideological constraints in the left and right section
of the LR scale, according to size of community: comparing waves 1989 and 2002
Community size
“Horizontal” constraints: degree
of interrelatedness of 10 issue
positions
“Vertical constraints”: relationship
of 10 indicators to self placement
on LR scale
Multiple Corresp. Analysis:
explained inertias
Multivariate Regression:
corrected R-square
Left-center
scale section
center-right
scale section
left-center scale
section
center-right
scale section
1989 2002 1989 2002 1989 2002 1989 2002
- 2000 inhabitants .332 .420 .246 .273 .45 .53 .06 .11
2001-10000 inhabitants .392 .505 .276 .288 .57 .66 .23 .17
10001+ inhabitants .409 .530 .299 .394 .55 .63 .27 .32
Additional insights into current ideological developments can be gained by comparing party
sections with members of different age. Unfortunately, such comparisons are hampered by the
fact that the sample doesn't include really "juvenile" sections, because younger generations
show little motivation to join communal parties. Therefore, only "middle-aged" and "old-age"
sections can be confronted.
As seen from Table 17, sections with high percentage of younger members show higher de-
grees of vertical ideologization in both scale sections, while horizontal issue clusterings are
practically unaffected. This implies that the younger generation is somewhat more prone to
relate specific issue opinions to the abstract ideological axis of left-and right, so that a more
pronounced polarization between leftist and rightist ideology is created. However, only a small
number of issues seems to be responsible for this trend. Thus, leftism as well as rightist is
becoming more closely related to attitudes toward spending for social welfare spending, while
rightism gets additionally more closely related to ecologism and policies related to refugees.
As in the case of all cross sectional comparisons of age cohorts, a strong Caveat is in place
because any differences found may well stem from life cycle effects rather than from cleavag-
es between historical generations. In the present case, the current erosion of party member-
ship gives even rise to a third possible interpretation: that younger party members today
represent a narrower, more selective social stratum characterized by a relatively high political
commitment and ideological inclinations.
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Table 17: Horizontal and vertical ideological constraints in the left-center and the center-right
section of the LR scale, according to percentage of active members below 45 (wave 2002)
Political Issues:
MCA factor scores Correlation withLR scale value
left-center
section
center-
right sec-
tion
left-center
section
center-
right sec-
tion
% active
members
below 45
% active
members
below 45
% active
members
below 45
% active
members
below 45
<30 >70 <30 >70 <30 >70 <30 >70
Promoting Switzerland as a financial center inv) .615 .538 .239 .180 .67 .68 .29 .21
Empowerment of workers/employees .482 .416 .388 .259 .48 .53 .30 .30
Higher tax rates for the wealthy .456 .383 .354 .215 .53 .51 .27 .27
Reducing the tax load ( inv) .405 .422 .176 .200 .53 .49 .28 .26
Expanding governm. budget for social welfare .669 .654 .665 .632 .53 .60 .43 .51
Expanding governm. budget for cultural matters .475 .490 .341 .378 .47 .42 .28 .34
Less governmental reglementation inv .482 .477 .177 .165 .58 .62 .17 .17
More ecological restrictions on public projects .351 .267 .225 .372 .39 .34 .16 .46
Nuclear energy should be abandoned .580 .594 .436 .413 .55 .61 .28 .30
More efforts for achieving gender equality .191 .252 .121 .165 .31 .35 .15 .27
More public daycare facilities for kids .421 .537 .280 .294 .40 .50 .21 .34
More efforts for increasing public security (inv) .286 .478 .106 .154 .36 .54 .19 .15
Better care for asylum seekers / refugees .595 .693 .567 .536 .49 .61 .34 .43
Swiss should become member of the EU .305 .394 .165 .303 .44 .43 .26 .31
The Swiss Army should be abolished .594 .619 .262 .283 .62 .67 .23 .18
Eigenvalues 6.97 7.22 4.50 4.55
Explained inertias .460 .481 .286 .303
Corrected R-Square (Linear multivariate Regres-
sion) .598 .698 .212 .310
(N = ) 152 149 152 119
7. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to explore the strength and causal determinants of ideological think-
ing within political parties. By focusing on local party sections, we concentrate on a usually
much neglected intermediate layer of the political system: located between the total voting
population (or party members) on the one hand and the “real” political elites on the other.
While the term “ideology” is used with many different meanings, most definitions stress that
the concept refers to something like a “an organized collection of ideas”6 or “the integrated
assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program.7
Empirical operationalizations are inevitably confronted with the fact that such “systemness” is
a variable ranging between complete looseness to tightly crystallized structure, and that two
dimensions of coupling have to be analytically separated:
1) “Horizontal couplings” as they are manifested in intercorrelations between different beliefs
or opinions:
2) “Vertical couplings” as they appear in the degree to which specific beliefs are related to
more abstract concepts which are used for denoting encompassing views of society, poli-
6 Wikipedia (July 31 2008) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideology
7 Merriam-Webster dictionary
Hans Geser:: Educated, Urbanized – and Narrow-minded? http://socio.ch/par/ges_18.pdf
33
tics, economy and culture: terms like “conservatism” or “liberalism”, “fascism” or “socialism”,
“left” or “right”
On the basis of overwhelming empirical evidence, we started with the premise that by far the
most salient ideological dimension in the Swiss political system – like in most other countries –
is the polarity between “left” and “right”.
Ideological thinking along these traditional lines has survived (or even been strenghtened re-
cently) for reasons associated with the increasing needs to “reduce complexity” in increasingly
pluralistic, intransparent and volatile political systems: despite the fact that
- both poles have constantly been enriched with additional issues (not intrinsically related
to each other)
- in comparison to the class struggle periods in the 19th and early 20th century, ideologies
are less needed as tools for social consensus-building and collective actions.
Given the highly pluralized party systems in Switzerland (supported by a decentralized Fede-
ralism as well as by proportional election laws), it is not to be expected that this country is a
forerunner in the emergence of de-ideologized “catch-all parties” (Kirchheimer 1965). How-
ever, the results presented above show shockingly high trends of ideologization at least on the
left-center section of the spectrum, especially in the vertical dimension. Thus, more than 64
percent of the variance in LR-scale placements between 1 and 6 can be explained with out 15
issue predictors. By contrast, rightist ideologies are much less articulated, as the explanatory
power of these same predictors (for scale values spreading between 5 and 10) doesn’t sur-
pass 18%. Leftist ideologization is particularly pronounced in German speaking (and least in
Italian speaking) regions of Switzerland, while right wing ideology is on the same level in all
parts of the country.
Urbanization stands out as a major causal factor: On both sides of the spectrum, ideological
constraints are significantly higher in larger than in smaller communities, and more pro-
nounced in suburban settings than in villages far from the next city. However, this effects
seems to be largely due to the fact that more “political” interpretation of communal issues pre-
vail in urban communities – so that size effects are dramatically reduced when “degree of poli-
ticization” is controlled.
City size is also a potent intervening variable. Thus, only in rather small communities, it is
found that ideologization correlates positively with the educational level and the modern occu-
pational background of party members, with exposition of the local sections to the programs of
supralocal mother parties, and with the number of other local parties with which they have to
compete. Evidently, the politicization effects going along with larger populations and urbaniza-
tion are sufficient causes of ideologization: overriding many other effects that are visible when
such impacts are very weak.
In communities of given site, ideological thinking is more pronounced when parties possess a
small share of political power (or none at all).
Finally, there is evidence that ideological constraints in party policy has increased since the
late eighties of the last century, and that it may increase further because younger age cohorts
are more prone to clustering issue positions tightly and for relating them closely to abstract
notions of “left” and “right”.
The historian Michael Hunt (1990) defines ideology as “an interrelated set of convictions or
assumptions that reduces . . . complexities . . . to easily comprehensible terms and suggests
appropriate ways of dealing with'' (them). As these needs for reducing complexities are cer-
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tainly persisting – and most likely to increase in these times of multiplying issues and turbulent
political processes – ideologies are likely to survive even when no basis for consistent order-
ing or deductive subsumption is existing. Especially on the left side of the spectrum, we see
not only the persistence, but even the ongoing tightening of “heteromorphic” ideologies en-
compassing a multitude of issue stances not intrinsically related to each other, and not logi-
cally implicated in any consistent “Weltanschauung” or philosophical system. In contrast to
classical socialism or liberalism, many items seem to be on an ad hoc basis, and they may
easily be eliminated and substituted as a consequence of changing political fads and fashions.
As an example, we may cite the stances of leftist parties toward atomic energy, which has
changed from a supportive opinion (in the late 1950ies) to a sharply inimical position later on.
The focus on “complexity reduction” helps also to doubt all assertions that ideological thinking
is a correlate of higher political knowledge and sophistication. To the contrary: it indicates
- a deplorable lack of pragmatism as t is often cultivated in cohesive sect-like groupings that
have no access to political decisions
- a deficit of autonomous thinking that may be associated with weak personality systems as
well as with social conformity pressures (e.g. “group think” tendencies as they often exist
within tightly integrated elites).
In contradiction to most conventional wisdom, we may tentatively conclude that political think-
ing is more “rational” at the peripheries than in the more central spheres of modern societies.
It is in the smaller communities and among party members with traditional occupational back-
grounds where there is most readiness to evaluate every issue on its own merits and to adapt
opinions pragmatically to specific circumstances: irrespective of wider social pressures and
ideological constraints.
The more we move from the countryside to the suburban belts and the larger cities, from far-
mers and the petty bourgeoisie to modern professionals and employees, and municipal to
cantonal and national level of politics, the higher is the disposition to simplify such evaluation
processes by assimilating whole bundles of opinions: like choosing among a very small num-
ber of prefabricated fashionable costumes.
Thus, when an urban party section declares that it is against the promotion of Switzerland as a
worldwide center of finance, we can predict with high certainty that it is also fighting against
nuclear power plants and sharper laws against immigration and supporting new daycare facili-
ties for kids as well as the entry of Switzerland to the EU – despite the fact that these issues
are not intrinsically connected and not implicated by common encompassing principles, value
or norms.
We may speculate about the many dysfunctional consequences resulting from this “patholo-
gy”: e. g.
- the trends toward free-wheeling overpolarized ideological discussions that may contribute
much more to public media entertainment than to the solution of current political problems;
- the hesitance of supralocal parties to cooperate among each other and enter into coalitions
(Holler 1981), and to adapt their policies pragmatically to changing circumstances, instead of
clinging rigidly to preformulated positions.
Of course, it seems unrealistic to transfer this “local pragmatism” to the urban sphere and the
national level, because too many cumbersome and time-consuming processes of reflection,
discussion, communication and negotiation would be needed when a wide range of issues
and many political actors are involved Wherever “real politics” is at stake, the demand for
ideological simplification will certainly remain high – and is likely to increase further in the fu-
ture, because the rising number and volatility of political issues collides ever more sharply with
the invariantly low individual and collective capacities to process information and generate
consensual judgments. Increasing these capacities (e. g. by ingenious applications of digital
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communication technologies) may be the major key for improving the rationality of political
processes at the levels where politics really takes place.
However, it is evident that functionalist theories provide only partial explanations because the
interregional divergences (6.3) show that there also cultural factors. Thus, the rather dogmatic
parties in German speaking regions may do well to “import” pragmatism by opening them-
selves up to influences from the other two regions.8
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